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CURRENT PROBLEMS OF STRUCTURING
PETRODOLLAR LOANS
By

STUART

R.

SINGER*

Rarely, if ever, have we seen a world in which trade has been carried out
and investments made across national frontiers through the medium of
freely available convertible currencies. The growth of multinational corporations on a large scale has, in the middle of the twentieth century, put
the problem of transferability, convertibility, and financing to the forefront
of the businessman's major problems. While it is true that the currencies
of Western Europe and the other major trading partners of the United
States are largely convertible for purposes of current account transactions,
and while it is true that major banking groups have flooded the world with
branches and other entities capable of making instant money transfers,
nevertheless, businessmen today live in a world where exchange and currency controls are the rule rather than the exception. The problems of these
controls, together with a cost engendered in taxation by one or more jurisdictions, make the transfer of funds and the building of financing packages
as difficult today as any time in the last twenty years. As taxing statutes
and exchange control regulations have been enacted, bankers and their
advisors have responded, with greater or lesser efficiency and dispatch,
with the creation of new types of financing packages suitable for multinational investment. At times aggressive and imaginative, these advisors
have frequently been timid and prosaic in their schemes. One glaring example is the period from the enactment of the Interest Equalization Tax
Extension Act of 1971' (permitting, for the first time, the issuance of Eurocurrency bonds by U.S. corporations without the medium of an international finance subsidiary) to the time of the first actual issuance, nearly
one year later. The principal reason for the delay was the feeling by "some
bankers in Europe" that the new vehicle "might" prove unattractive to the
customers of Swiss banking institutions. The ready and rapid success of
the Revlon placement and other issues in the second half of 1972 served to
eliminate these fears and most subsequent issues followed the lead in
structuring the bonds accordingly. 2
Advisors have not been alone in building a record of uneven success.
*Partner in the firm of Forry, Golbert and Singer, San Francisco, California. Dartmouth
College (A.B., 1962); Columbia Law School (LL.B., 1965); Graduate Institute of International
Studies, University of Geneva (D.es Sc. [Econ. cand.]). Member, International Consulting
Service, Coopers & Lybrand, New York, 1968-72; Associate, Simpson, Thacher, and Bartlett,
New York, 1972-73; International Tax Consultant, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., San Francisco, 1973-75. Member: Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Committee on
International Law, 1972-73); International Fiscal Association; American Bar Association.
1. 26 U.S.C.A. §§4911-20 (Supp. 1975).
2. E.g., Broadway Hale Stores, June 8, 1972; Owens, Illinois, Inc., June 20, 1972; Dart
Industries, August 3, 1972; Halliburton Co., September 6, 1972; AMF, Inc., September 14,
1972; Gillette Co., November 11, 1972.
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Government officials have blown alternately hot and cold with respect to
assisting U.S. corporations in obtaining foreign source funds for their operations.3 At times we have seen the Treasury at odds with other departments in the Government in spite of the fact that the balance of payments
policy of the United States was, in theory, being determined by an interdepartmental group representing Treasury, Commerce, etc. The U.S. corporation seeking foreign source funds has frequently been caught in the middle of one of these policy shifts. From a period of active encouragement,
beginning in 1965, of Euro-bond offerings, the Treasury moved to benevolent neutrality, and finally, in 1973, to a period of tacit opposition and
moderate obstructionism.
The problem has been that governmental fiscal policies draw their inspiration from a number of theoretical bases. A government may alter its
policies on taxation and exchange control for a number of reasons, including raising of revenue,' a desire for tax "neutrality," ' the protection of labor
forces in the U.S. domestic market, the reduction or elimination of a balance of payments deficit, change in the money supply, etc. Frequently, an
examination of any given revenue bill sitting in Congress will reveal proposals that combine these theories, sometimes even when the proposals
have been made by the same legislator. The result has been a patchwork,
inconsistent, and largely inadequate tax and exchange control regime
which has neither served to raise revenue for the United States nor encouraged U.S. businesses to a more simple and ready access of foreign-source
funds.
In this paper I have reviewed the history of this regulation (largely to
point out how financing package plans are themselves a direct response to
regulation by authorities) in the hope that, armed with this knowledge, we
may be able to put together, in the late 1970's, the much more sophisticated packages that are evidently going to be required. Underscoring this
should be the fact that, as mentioned above, regulation is the rule, not the
exception, and counselors must learn to deal with it on a permanent basis.
I.

SOME HISTORY

After the end of the Second World War, the capital needs of our major
trading partners, the industrial nations of Western Europe, impelled the
United States to use its own currency, not only as a pump primer in the
redevelopment of internal economies, but also as a means of providing
adequate liquidity for international transactions. This policy was carried
3. Contrast Federal Reserve Regulation M, 12 C.F.R. §213.7 (1975) with Foreign Direct
Investment Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §1000.324 (1973), revoked, 39 Fed. Reg. 25677 (1974).
4. This is true even though the neat formulae presented to Congress on the "revenue
effect" of tax measures have recently come under attack.
5. "Neutrality," in this context, means a legal regime in which the only function of
taxation is revenue raising and where business decisions are, of consequence, made for reasons
other than taxes.
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out largely through the means of the Marshall Plan of economic assistance,
with a lesser role being played by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In point of fact, the nations on the receiving end
underwent economic growth to an extent foreseen by none of the planners
in the immediate post-war period. It can even be said that within ten or
twelve years the rebuilding stage had not only ended, but had given way
to a plateau of development from which very substantial economic growth
was now possible.
A.

Outflow of Dollars: The Supply

At the beginning of 1958, most countries had returned to full peacetime
economic normalcy, and many were experiencing spectacular growth, particularly West Germany and Japan. General DeGaulle assumed authority
in France and enacted a number of political economic measures that directly and indirectly would permit the French economy to compete vigorously in this market. At about this time, all major Western European
currencies had become substantially convertible for purposes of current
transactions. The original policy of the U.S. government had not been
reversed or retracted, with the result that European traders were still encouraged to make international payments outside that of their own domestic currencies - the U.S. dollar.
It is impossible to estimate with any exactness the total of dollars exported during the years from the end of the Second World War through
1958, but U.S. governmental expenditures on economic and military
assistance probably made up the lion's share of the outflow. While U.S.
corporate investment did not assume the proportions of the 1960's and
1970's, the amounts spent overseas by U.S. businessmen were by no means
insubstantial. The problem of this situation was one which should have
been foreseen by many - that of the level of U.S. deficits reaching a point
high enough to undermine the confidence of foreign holders.
In this respect, it must be remembered that the pool of dollars cumulating outside of the United States served two principal functions. Not only
were they the chief means of exchange for international business transactions (both public and private), but they also served as a major supplement
to gold and gold certificates for the monetary reserves of many foreign
countries. Undermining of confidence in the value and/or stability of the
U.S. dollar would therefore manifest itself not only in normal market forces
but in, presumably, political reaction.
B.

Outflow of Dollars: The Demand

At the same time, a second significant force was serving to accelerate the
outflow of currencies from the United States. For a variety of historical
reasons, Western Europeans have not built a risk capital market as U.S.
businessmen understand that term, and the enormous growth in the
post-war years meant that many European enterprises, themselves

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

multinationals, were starved for long-term funds. Their most logical source
was the U.S. capital market, and the years of the late 1950's and early
1960's saw sharp increases in sales of securities in New York by large
European corporations. One result of U.S. portfolio investors placing their
money in this way was to accelerate even further the very significant payment outflow from the United States.
C.

Outflow of Dollars: Political Reaction

The result of these factors was that, for the first time, the United States
government began to take steps, albeit in an uneven and unsystematic
manner, to counter these deficits. Since it eschewed currency devaluation
as both politically undesirable and probably ineffective,, it was forced into
6. One may ask if this was actually the case. Analysis may be possible by first positing
the following model:
Common Causes of Payments Deficit:
1. Weakened competitive position in world market because of:
a. inflation at home;
b. production and distribution inefficiencies; and
c. tariffs in export markets.
2. Government expenditures abroad, resulting in a net outflow from:
a. economic aid not tied to purchase of grantor's goods; and
b. military expenditures.
3. Private capital outflows, based on:
a. higher rates of return abroad; and
b. business acquisitions to ensure sources of supply.
4. Tourism expenditures on:
a. goods and services abroad; and
b. travel on foreign carriers.
Corrective Measures
1. Adjust the exchange rate to:
a. freely fluctuating rates, determined strictly by supply and demand;
b. an adjustable peg system, permitting periodic revaluation;
c. pegged rates with flexible ranges permitted.
2. Adjust commercial policy:
a. monetary policy by:
1. changing domestic interest rates;
2. changing the supply of money.
b. fiscal policy by:
1. raising taxes;
2. changing Government spending policies.
c. direct controls imposed on:
1. money (exchange controls, interest equalization tax);
2. goods (tariffs, quotas, price supports);
3. people (travel restrictions).
The historical effectiveness of an exchange rate adjustment (combined with adequate safeguards against domestic inflation) as opposed to the other remedies, must be weighed against
the fact that perhaps only a few countries would have accepted the new rate without adjustments on their own. This was no longer true, of course, ten years later when European
inflation and other factors led many Europeans to press for a U.S. devaluation.
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a series of piecemeal measures which had, at best, only a moderate effect
in countering the deficit.'
1963 through 1975
The beginning of the 1960's saw an enormous growth in international
financial placements and a concomitant growth in the deficit of the U.S.
balance of payments. The spectre of a unified European economic
community with a planned common currency underscored the need for the
United States to take some sort of action. The action was twofold. Congress
enacted legislation empowering the President to negotiate significant specific reductions in tariffs with the rest of the world. These discussions,
referred to as the Kennedy Round, did lead to some reductions, although
their real impact on the U.S. export performance (and therefore on the
U.S. balance of payments deficit) remains unclear. The second step was
the imposition of an excise tax on the acquisition, by U.S. citizens and
residents, of securities issued by foreign borrowers. The tax was high
enough so that the door was effectively closed to most foreign companies
seeking to raise risk or debt capital in New York.
But the real impact of the interest equalization tax was what seemed at
the time to be merely a side effect. For those European corporations seeking to place long-term bonds, there was no viable alternative to the New
York markets. Accordingly, a new market was invented. Within three
months of the effective date of the statute, an Italian highway agency
placed a bond denominated in U.S. dollars and sold directly to European
holders. In theory, European holders, both individual and corporate, had
always held substantial amounts of funds; they simply had not had the
means of exchange or investment available to place these with business
borrowers. The Euro-currency bond or Euro-bond sought to bridge this
gap, this lack of a trading medium, by designing an issue streamlined
enough to be sold directly to the investor, without the need for a complicated trading vehicle. More importantly, this first issue showed European
multinationals that the dollars were available for their purposes, and that
they needed only to construct types of paper and corporate vehicles suitable to the transaction to obtain large portions of these funds.
7. These included "buy-American" restrictions on foreign assistance and reduction of the
duty-free allowance for returning tourists. For a more detailed analysis see HABERLER AND
WILLETT, U.S. BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM (1968).
Triffin notes that while the net outflow of private capital was reduced from 4.5 billion in
1962 to 3.7 billion in 1963, the outflow of U.S.-owned funds increased sharply. The principal
factor of deterioration certainly does not lie in the transactions on current account or on
foreign aid, which show persistent and massive improvement during this period (deficits of
$1.1 billion per year in 1950-54 and $0.2 billion in 1955-59, but surpluses of $1.8 billion in
1960-64, and $4 billion in 1964). It is, instead, the net outflows of private capital ($0.3 billion

in 1955-59, $4.5 billion in 1960-64, and $5.6 billion in 1964). See

TRIFFIN, THE BALANCE OF

PAYMENTS AND THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES
8. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §4911ff, 26 U.S.C.A. §4911 (Supp. 1975).

(1966).
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One of the difficulties in trying to stem the tide of any phenomenon
which is at least partly fluid is that the dam must cover all channels. At
the same time that portfolio investors were being cut off, U.S. banks began
to increase their business to foreign borrowers significantly, and this aspect
of the flow was treated only after two more years had passed.'
D.

Size Of The Market

It is far from clear how sizable the actual Euro-dollar pool was at this
time, although estimates have been made of up to ten or twelve billion
dollars. The real owners of these funds are seldom identified, but presumably, they include such diverse types as Latin American industrialists,
Middle Eastern sheiks, European businessmen, and the Soviet Union
(anxious to reinvest foreign exchange earned in trading with the West).
The standard to measure the growth of the pool is not dissimilar from that
in measuring any other pool, that is to say, the willingness of the various
wealth holders to keep their capital in dollars and to relend it within that
particular market.
The significance of the 1963 Euro-bond placement was the creation, in
the minds of the Euro-currency holders, of the existence of a market, as
opposed to a mere pool of funds. Once created, this attitude and willingness to reinvest funds within the market could now cause it to grow geometrically (particularly since none of the lenders was subject to any national reserve requirements).
1965 through 1967
Although the direct relationship is less clear, the continued deterioration
in the United States trade surplus played an important part in accelerating
the imposition of controls on the part of the U.S. government. This reduction in surplus coincided in point of time with a great increase in direct
investment in plant and equipment by U.S. business. It was this that led
many economists and politicians to posit the theory that exports and direct
investments might be, at least in part, alternative choices for many U.S.
businessmen and that to discourage one was to encourage the other. Accordingly, it was argued that one realistic means of encouraging U.S. exports (in the face of relatively lower labor costs overseas vis-a-vis the
United States) was the restriction of U.S. direct investments abroad. This
contention has been the subject of a number of examinations, few of them
particularly systematic, and none of them conclusive.
In any event, the United States reacted with the two-pronged program
restricting both the largest U.S. corporations and U.S. banks lending overseas. Although these two particular sources of outflows were checked, once
again the U.S. government had stemmed only one channel of the river
9. On February 10, 1965 the Federal Reserve Bank notified commercial banks of its
intention to act, issuing specific guidlines several weeks later.
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without dealing with the remainder. In fact, one of the principal effects of
the program, which restricted only the few hundred top U.S. corporations,
was to encourage all the corporations not covered to steal a march on their
larger competitors and to open up shop overseas, which they could do
without restriction. At the beginning of 1965, the restricted companies
accounted for something over 90% of the total U.S. direct investment
abroad; by the end of 1967, this percentage had dropped to around 50%.'"
Nevertheless, the 1965 restrictions were a significant block to certain
large U.S. corporations, and this restriction gave rise to one of the most
important technical developments in international financing, the so-called
international finance subsidiary bond placement. These vehicles, a combination of ancient statute, legal ingenuity, and tacit cooperation of the U.S.
Treasury, served to provide the restricted U.S. companies with a proper
means of continuing their financing of foreign operations (by using foreignsource funds) within the letter and the spirit of the exchange restrictions."
Once the phenomenon was shown to be viable for U.S. corporate borrowers,
however, it became immensely popular, and not always for corporations
seeking to work within the existing capital controls. The addition of U.S.
corporate borrowers to the European ones already existing in the Eurocurrency bond market meant that the demand for money was increasing
in that market and that interest rates would go up slightly. In addition,
corporations were also selling bonds convertible into common stock, thus
combining the bond market with the desire of European fund holders to
invest in the U.S. risk capital market.2 Finally, it is likely that the demand
for money by this new larger pool of corporate borrowers accelerated the
flow of loose funds around the world into places where they could be invested in this market itself; the market was actually increasing to major
proportions from its humble beginnings as a stopgap, created to live within
the fiscal and monetary regulation. In fact, for a long period of time, it was
thought that the Euro-currency bond market would take on enormous
porportions, develop after-markets, variable types of paper, etc. Although
much of this never came to pass, it is not clear that, given a few more years
of significant regulation, it would not have done so in due course. 3
10. Statement of Charles E. Fiero, Director of the Office of Foreign Direct Investments,
before the Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments of the Joint Economic
Committee, January 15, 1969.
11. See 26 U.S.C.A. §861(a)(1)(B) (Rev. 1966) and 26 U.S.C.A. §4912(b)(3) (Supp. 1975).
12. The first Euro-bond sold by a U.S. corporate group, the Monsanto issue of October
20, 1965, was convertible into the common stock of the parent company.
13. Several attempts were made to create secondary markets in Euro-bonds, none particularly successful. For all of its breadth, the bond market was never very deep and, historically,
was able to absorb only a limited amount of paper within a fixed time period. Furthermore,
the purchasers of these bonds appear to have been more interested in the trading in the
underlying common stock (in the case of convertibles) than in the trading of the bond itself.
One interesting sidelight was the marketing of a type of commercial paper in the Eurocurrency market. The underwriters obtained the necessary clearances of the various regula-
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1968 through 1974
Toward the end of 1967, the U.S. balance of payments deficit reached
the dimensions of a political crisis and the Government finally attempted
to deal with a number of different channels of outflows at the same stroke.
Still avoiding devaluation of the currency, measures included restriction
of private capital investment overseas, a suggested tax on tourist spending
overseas, and a suggested import tax. 4 These last two were never enacted,
since, like the devaluation of the currency, they were at that stage still
politically impractical. Furthermore, if one accepts the theory that the
principal cause of the continuing trade deficit was the domestic inflation
(during the years since 1964, the export performance had remained relatively constant; it was the rapid increase in imported goods that resulted
in the deterioration of the once significant trade surplus), 15 then the real
attack on the problem might have been to reduce those fiscal and monetary
policies that were contributing to the enormous overheating of the U.S.
domestic economy. The problem was that these too, fell into the area of
politically undesirable steps. While many opposed the U.S. military action
in Southeast Asia, few did so principally on the basis of the U.S. balance
of payments.
But the much broader restrictions of the foreign direct investment program meant that once again, large numbers of businesses were forced to
look outside normal channels for their major long-range financing. Just as
the 1965 program had stimulated U.S. corporations into using the medium
Euro-currency bond market, so did the 1968 program stimulate the the
medium-sized U.S. corporations into employing short and medium term
bank and private placement financing for these same purposes. Although
no specific structural vehicle can be said to have been produced at this
time as a direct result of this program, two important variations did arise.
The first variation was a much greater use of international banking
channels as sources of, and conduits for short- and medium-term funds.
Most of the present-day arsenal of Euro-currency bank placements were
born during the first two years of the 1968 program. Secondly, the international finance subsidiary, first developed in 1965, underwent a significant
mutation to provide long-term funds in the United States for a number of
U.S. corporations.17
tory authorities and found two major U.S. corporations to be the first issuers. Although the
underwriters were optimistic, this type of placement never took hold. In all fairness, much of
the blame for the lack of success may be the fact that the first issues were announced on the
same day the Penn Central went under.
14. Message of the President, January 1, 1968, reproduced in 4 PRES. Docs. 16 (1968).
15. Between 1967 and 1968, exports increased by 9.4% but imports increased by 23.5%.
NELSON

AND LECHTER, THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS IN 1968; SURVEY OF CURRENCY BUSINESS

(January, 1969).
16. Statement of Charles E. Fiero, note 10, supra.
17. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §861(a)(1)(c) and §1441; Rev. Proc. 66-40, 1966-2 CuM.
BULL. 1245. Also see Treaty with the Netherlands on Double Taxation, April 29, 1948 [1947],
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1974 through 1975
From January, through the end of June in 1974, the unreality of the
game of international finance structures reached new heights. Section
4912(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code permitted investors to cause the
interest equalization tax to apply to designated securities issued by them
even though the actual tax on such securities - and presumably, the
consequent effect on the market for such securities - was negligible."8
Nevertheless, the Treasury insisted that the statute was still vital 9 as
investors continued to use the device, and it was felt that the various
interested parties would manage to replace the existing structures with a
more comprehensive one by the end of June, the date of the expiration of
the Act.
The result of all this effort of tax advisors and government representatives was almost shockingly thin, particularly in the light of increased
interest by foreigners in investment in the United States. 0 The use of the
taxing authority to regulate flows of funds across borders probably creates
more problems than it solves; may distort normal patterns of investment;
and may be among the most inefficient ways of effecting substantive political and social change. The massive expenditure of time and money by
those involved in the creation and regulation of tax law has been exceeded
perhaps in only one area, that body of law establishing and regulating our
best known white elephant, the DISC."'

II.

THE PRESENT ERA

It is to be left to future generations of practitioners and scholars to assess
whether the combination of overaction and neglect was, in the long run,
benign or harmful. For our purposes, the years 1963 through 1974 serve as
a backdrop of tax regulation against which we must create and operate
within structures for the latter half of the 1970's. At this point, therefore,
it is necessary to examine the business and financial forces behind the
various types of borrowings and investments since these too, have changed
dramatically since the late sixties and early 1970's.
62 Stat. 1757, T.I.A.S. No. 1855, as extended to the Netherlands Antilles by Protocol, June
15, 1955 [1955], 6 U.S.T. 3696 T.I.A.S. No. 3366 and supplemented by Protocol, October
23, 1963 [1964], 15 U.S.T. 1900, T.I.A.S. No. 5665.
18. See Exec. Order No. 11,745, 38 Fed. Reg. 35423 (1973), 26 U.S.C.A. §4911 (Supp.
1975).
19.

T.I.R. 1279, P-H 1974 FED. TAXES, EXCISE TAXES

196,539.

20. Foreign investment increased to the point of Congress asking both Commerce and
Treasury to prepare a detailed statistical study of it. Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974,
15 U.S.C.A. §78b (Supp. Feb., 1975).
21. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §991ff, 26 U.S.C.A. §991ff (Supp. 1975) and interminable
regulations and rulings thereunder.
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Sources Of Fund Placements

At the simplest level, people who hold excess liquidity can supply funds,
at a profit, to people requiring liquidity for capital investment purposes.
The most common means is any commercial or governmental banking
system. In spite of the myriad of controls which obtains when transferring
funds across jurisdictions, the medium of the multinational banking system remains (and in theory ought to be) available to channel the vast
majority of available petrodollar funds. The difficulty in this case has been
the traditional unwillingness of most of the holders of petrodollar funds to
employ these channels. This may reflect a lack of confidence in banks
controlled by Westerners, or simply a desire to place investment funds
directly in the country where they are to be ultimately used. It would seem
probable that this situation will become more and more limited in the
future as the multinational banks become more established and more sophisticated in the Middle East, as petrodollar holders establish their own
financial institutions to act in the stead of banks, and as these holders gain
more confidence in existing banking circles. Nevertheless, such a situation
is probably several years away and it is not clear that the combination of
various banking channels will ever assume the responsibility for gathering
and investing the vast majority of available petrodollar funds. Therefore,
when we analyze the role of banks for purposes of our legal analysis of the
placement problems, we are talking about banks in their capacity as
agents or brokers in the money market.
A second role of banks is to be a passive holder of deposits, the
disposition and investment of which are determined by other entities. A
third source of fund placements may be the so-called free-lance operator
in the Euro-currency market (usually London, but also Singapore and
Beirut) that looks for sources and placement availabilities like any other
broker in any other volatile market. The final source of funds, for the U.S.
based corporation, is the borrowers themselves, with the only medium
being an artificial structure.
B.

Summary Of Existing Mechanisms For Placements

Before discussing the structures which may be suitable for petrodollar
financings, we must consider the role of two potential developments. Two
possibilities remain that may obviate the necessity of much of the structural planning. The first is the potential reduction of circumstances in
which the U.S. will impose an income tax on foreign recipients of U.S.source interest and dividend income.22 The second is the creation by the
U.S. government of structures designed to absorb investment funds in the
U.S. and to apply them to businesses therein. What seemed to be the most
promising possibility a few years ago, a joint project of the Treasury and
the Securities and Exchange Commission for a regulated "off-shore" mu22.

See Proposed Tax Reform Act of 1975, H.R. Rep. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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tual fund, has lain dormant since that time, and it is not clear that this is
a reasonable possibility on which advisors can plan. Thus, the examination
of the technical problem of the structures themselves is, of necessity, focused on the transaction between petrodollar holder and investment dollar
user, with the only intermediary being a controlled structure or a third
party acting as such.
C.

Taxation Of Debt Placements

Direct Loans
The regulation of the transfer of capital and the repayment of interest
on any loan made directly between the investing entity and the U.S. borrower will ordinarily mean that the interest payment is taxable to the
recipient and is a tax deduction to the borrower. Unless the creditor falls
within one of the relatively narrow exceptions outlined in the Internal
Revenue Code, it will be taxed at a rate equal to 30% of gross income
received.13 This rule is frequently modified by the United States when the
interest income is paid to an entity resident in a jurisdiction which has
concluded a double taxation agreement with the U.S. More importantly
for current plans, it is the policy of the United States to negotiate wherever
possible, for a reduction to zero on withholding tax imposed on both dividend and interest income. Apparently, according to Treasury officials,
relatively recent treaties which have not eliminated this tax entirely have
been due to the opposition of the foreign country, not that of the United
States.
The problem is the unavailability of relevant treaties for most of our
placements. To date there is no double taxation treaty between the United
States and any petroleum exporting country (although one should be concluded with Iran in the near future). The result is that the successful use
of an existing treaty presupposes that one additional corporation, related
or unrelated as the case may be, must be added to the chain of entities in
the transfer of loan principal and retransfer of interest payments on the
debt. The proposed transaction in this case involves the establishment by
the creditorof a resident entity in a jurisdiction which has concluded a tax
treaty with the United States. For example, a Kuwaiti company may
establish an operating branch in the United Kingdom which transfers the
loan principal to a U.S. borrower and receives the interest payments therefrom. The issue is whether the U.K. branch of the Kuwaiti corporation is
entitled to the benefits of the U.K.-U.S. double taxation treaty which
would, if applicable, provide that the interest payments from the United
States to the United Kingdom are not subject to U.S. income withholding
tax at all."
23. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§162, 871, 881, and 1441.
24. Treaty with the United Kingdom on Double Taxation, April 16, 1945 [1946], 60 Stat.
1377, T.I.A.S. No. 1546, amended by Double Taxation: Taxes on Income, March 17, 1966
[1966], 17 U.S.T. 1254, T.I.A.S. No. 6089.
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Generalizations about tax effects of double tax treaties are dangerous;
treaties have been negotiated over a long period of time, during many
changes in national treaty policy and sophistication in draftsmanship.
Thus, a relatively old treaty, such as the U.K.-U.S. one, may provide a
number of traps for the tax advisor not considering its provisions in exact
detail. Every treaty provides within its own articles three types of "coverage." ' -' These are (1) the taxes which are regulated by the treaty, (2) jurisdiction of the treaty, and (3) individual entities (or taxpayers) regulated.
The first, in the case of the United States, usually is limited to the Federal
income tax; in the case of certain foreign jurisdictions other taxes may be
added (for example, certain capital taxes, the French stock transfer tax
and the Netherlands property and capital tax). Furthermore, certain treaties provide that should existing income tax laws be abrogated in favor of a
subsequent statute which, in effect, takes over the function of those existing taxes, the new taxes would themselves be regulated by the existing
treaty."
In the case of jurisdictions, the usual rule is to limit the jurisdiction of
the treaty to the so-called metropole, although in certain instances this
may be extended to certain overseas territories, trusteeships, or departments by special protocol or amendment to the treaty. A particular problem has arisen in the inclusion or exclusion of those areas known as the
Continental Shelf claimed by certain jurisdictions. In the Internal Revenue
Code, the Continental Shelf is includable as U.S. national territory and is
defined as:
[T]he territorial sea thereof (and) the seabed and subsoil of the adjacent
submarine areas beyond the territorial sea over which the U.S. exercises
27
sovereign rights in accordance with international law.
The difficulty with this definition is that the international law on the
question is far from clear. The mechanical definition of the "Continental
Shelf" was developed by the United States to deal with a problem of
jurisdiction and/or sovereignty between the federal government and the
states and dealt principally with the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico.
The use of the "shelf" definition is not nearly so convenient in parts of the
world where the geological structure may differ markedly. For example,
the use of this same standard in the Persian Gulf might extend the sover25. See, e.g., Treaty with the Netherlands on Double Taxation, April 29, 1948, 6 Stat.
1757, T.I.A.S. No. 1855, as amended December 30, 1965 [1966] 17 U.S.T. 896, T.I.A.S. No.
6051; Treaty with the United Kingdom on Double Taxation, April 16, 1945 [19461 60 Stat.
1377, T.I.A.S. No. 1546, as amended March 17, 1966 [19661 17 U.S.T. 1254, T.I.A.S. No.
6089; Treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany on Double Taxation, July 25, 1954
[1954], 5 U.S.T. 2768, T.I.A.S. No. 3133, as amended September 17, 1965 [1965], 16 U.S.T.
1875, T.I.A.S. No. 5920.
26. See, e.g., Treaty with France on Double Taxation, July 28, 1967 [19671, art. 1(3), 19
U.S.T. 5280, T.I.A.S. No. 6518.
27. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §638, 26 U.S.C.A. §638 (Supp. 1975).
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eignty of certain countries to a point reaching half way to the South Pole.
Therefore, other definitions of "soveriegn territory" have been suggested,
including actual distance limit from the seashore (roughly equivalent to
200 miles) and certain restricted sovereignty exercises, e.g., solely for oil
drilling, solely for off-shore platforms, solely for fishing rights, etc.
For our purposes, the critical definition in this example is not the question of jurisdiction (since we may posit that our branch will be located in
the city of London), but one of taxpayers covered. The issue of whether a
U.K. branch of a foreign corporation was to be entitled to the benefits of
the U.S.-U.K. double taxation treaty was, prior to 1972, the subject of a
great deal of abuse by practitioners. Mechanically, it is the law of the
treaty which provides the terms of its coverage.28 Thus, the treaty provides
that all taxpayers in the United Kingdom who are "resident" therein may
avail themselves of the benefits of the treaty.2" The question of "residency"
in the United Kingdom, however, is one to be determined under local U.K.
law. As a general rule, a company is to be considered resident in that
jurisdiction when it is considered "to be managed and controlled" in the
United Kingdom. Taking this a step further, a company whose principal
place of business is not within the United Kingdom, whose headquarters
of operations (si~ge social) is not in the United Kingdom, and whose place
of management is not in the United Kingdom would ordinarily not be
considered managed and controlled in the United Kingdom. It would appear that in the case of non-U.K. corporations, only those for whom the
preponderant majority of operations is located solely within the United
Kingdom would appear to qualify. Thus, our Kuwaiti company would
unquestionably not be entitled to the withholding tax exemption under the
U.S. treaty.
In 1972, Revenue Ruling 72-37810 outlined the basic fact situation mentioned above and underscored the existing rule of domestic U.K. taxation
and its consequence to the U.K.-U.S. treaty. A year later, the obvious
exception to that rule was restated in a subsequent revenue ruling.' It is
to be emphasized that although such rulings are helpful, they point out two
interesting facts. First, practitioners have attempted to take advantage of
the treaties without a careful examination of the law under which they
operate; and secondly, the rulings themselves cannot do anything more
28. Sections 894 and 7852 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 indicate that the Treaty
provision is not only equal in force to any federal statute but, insofar as any federal income
tax statute is contra, that statute is superceded. See Treaty with the Federal Republic of
Germany on Double Taxation, as amended September 17, 1965 [1965], art. XVIII(2), 16
U.S.T. 1875, T.I.A.S. No. 5920; Treaty with Luxembourg on Double Taxation, December 18,
1962 [1964], art. XX(2), 15 U.S.T. 2355, T.I.A.S. No. 5726; Treaty with Norway on Double
Taxation, December 3, 1971 [1971], art. XXII(2), 23 U.S.T. 2832, T.I.A.S. No. 7474.
29. Treaty with the United Kingdom on Double Taxation, as amended March 17, 1966
[1966], art. II, 17 U.S.T. 1254, T.I.A.S. No. 6089.
30. Rev. Rul. 72-378, 1972-2 CUM. BULL. 662.
31. Rev. Rul. 73-354, 1973-2 CuM. BULL. 435.
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than restate an existing rule. They cannot, for example, discuss the United
Kingdom law on "managed and controlled" with respect to very detailed
fact situations. Rather, they simply restate a position based on an already
existing conclusion of U.K. law. Any but the most simple of structures
should, therefore, be passed on by tax advisors practicing in the jurisdiction whose law governs.
Interest Income to a Bank
If we are unable to use a U.K. branch of a Kuwaiti corporation, it might
be possible to use a bank owned by our creditor (or in partnership with our
creditor) for which the interest would be a different type of income than it
would be to the creditor directly. Here we are in the realm of anticipation
of future law, both domestic and by treaty. The receipt of interest by a
bank or other financial institution has never been treated adequately by
either double taxation treaty or internal tax law. If the United States
should propose a statutory change eliminating withholding tax to foreign
recipients on interest paid on certain portfolio investments, it could, with
equal validity, enact either a statutory change or a change to the regulations which would provide that interest received by foreign financial
institutions (not doing business in the United States), would be treated in
the same manner as payments to a foreign manufacturer for the sale of
goods into the United States. If the transaction could take place in such a
manner that title passage, negotiations, and conclusion of the original
contract were to take place outside of the United States, the amount might
not be taxable at all. This would be done by treating financial institution
income across national borders in roughly the same manner as it is treated
within the United States.
The receipt of such income by a financial institution in a situation where
income is paid from one treaty country to another would then, presumably,
be treated as the receipt of industrial and commercial profits by the creditor institution, with all of the implications of that term in all of the existing
tax treaties. Historically, there have been few actual or usable definitions
of industrial and commercial profits. Even the OECD Model Draft (article
21) backs off from a precise consideration of interest by analysis of the
nature of the recipient, rather than analysis of the nature of the income.
Turning to examples of U.S. treaties: in the U.S.-Japan treaty, industrial
and commercial profits specifically includes passive income from leasing
operations;" the U.S.-Norway treaty provides that industrial and
commercial profits include income from leasing and film rentals;- and the
U.S.-Belgium treaty provides that industrial and commercial profits
32. Treaty with Japan on Double Taxation, March 8, 1971 [1973], art. 8(5), 23 U.S.T.
967, T.I.A.S. No. 7365.
33. Treaty with Norway on Double Taxation, December 3, 1971 11971], art. 5(5), 23
U.S.T. 2832, T.I.A.S. No. 7474.
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include income from film rentals." In the case of income accruing to banks
and similar financial institutions, there is no specific provision in any of
the existing U.S. income tax treaties, although certain treaties between
other countries do so provide.
Precedent for the separate treatment of interest paid to a financial institution arises in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 under Sections 951ff,
901, 904(g), etc. It would seem that the real distinction is not the legal
nature of the payment but the nature of the income to the recipient, that
is to say, whether it is active or passive income.
There is but little law on the subject, and it suggests the confusion in
which we currently find ourselves. On the one hand, where the transaction
involves payments that are paid out and received within the United States
(even if the payor or the payee may be related to a foreigner), it will be
analyzed on an "active-passive" basis, whereas direct transactions between a U.S. entity and a foreign entity may be treated on the other basis.3
This would suggest that while the more progressive view may have the
sympathy of courts in a position to take that view, the attitude of the
Treasury with respect to transactions with a foreign entity seems to be that
any change must be the subject of actual treaty negotiations and will not
be effected unilaterally by the United States.
Thus, two possibilities may have been largely eliminated, the use of a
branch in the United Kingdom and the use of a Kuwaiti bank or similar
financial institution. A third means of reduction of withholding tax on
interest paid directly to our Kuwaiti entity is the possibility that the Kuwaiti corporation is, in effect, an agency of a foreign government and is
entitled to the exclusion provisions of the Internal Revenue Code which
reflect classic international law on sovereign immunity. That statute,
Internal Revenue Code, section 892, provides that income of foreign governments and their agencies shall be exempt from taxation by the United
States unless (and here again it reflects a classic distinction in international law) the owner of the income is not a "corporation" as that term is
understood in the United States." Therefore, while the French government
may not be taxed on short-term deposits it holds in the United States for
maintenance of its embassies and missions therein, it may be taxable on
income derived from such things as a state-owned shipping corporation,
37
airline, trading corporation, etc.
The question is now whether a financing agency of the Kuwaiti government might be considered a "governmental agency" entitled to the
34. Treaty with Belgium on Double Taxation, July 9, 1970 [1971], art. 7(5), 23 U.S.T.
2687, T.I.A.S. No. 7463.
35. Compare Rev. Rul. 65-78, 1975-1 CuM. BULL. with Rev. Rul. 73-562, 1973-2 Cum. BULL.
434. See also Rev. Rul. 73-419, 1973-2 CuM. BULL. 436 for a discussion of a similar situation
involving royalty payments.
36. 26 U.S.C.A. §892 (Rev. 1967).
37. For a careful analysis of these provisions, see Rendell and Stiefel, U.S. Tax Exemption
for Foreign Governments, Internationals,Their Employees, J. Tax., 108 (Aug. 1973).
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benefits of section 892. One simple guideline, used both in international
law and in the regulations under section 892, is whether the function of the
owner of the income is the accumulation of profit or the performance of a
function which is "governmental" in nature. It would seem, without careful examination, that the investment of petroleum exporting revenues per
se, would not ordinarily be entitled to the government-type exclusion
granted by section 892. On the other hand, international law in this area
is not detailed, and it might be possible for a taxpayer to establish to the
I.R.S. that the creditor institution is not only an agency of the Kuwaiti
government charged with investing oil revenues, but that it is also an
agency which has as its principal function the maintenance of certain
development projects in Kuwait which do not inure to the profit of any
individual or any government (beyond the people served).
The taxpayer would probably also have to show that the income earned
on these invested funds is not the most significant aspect of the transactions entered into by the Kuwaiti government; this would probably be
easier to show if the taxpayer could prove that part of the reason for
entering into the transaction (on the part of the Kuwaitis) was to spread
out the receipt of certain growth income over a period of years, particularly
if the loan agreement provides for certain adjustment features for to take
account of changes in currency values and/or changes in values of oil exports.
The Use of Other Companies in the Group of the Borrower
We have considered various plans wherein the lender makes a special
accomodation to the borrower. It may be possible for a borrower to receive
the loan principal in, and pay the interest from, an affiliated company
located in a jurisdiction which itself has a treaty with the creditor's country
(or which, for certain reasons of local law, does not present any withholding
tax problems at all). If a foreign subsidiary of our borrower were to receive
these funds and pay them over to its parent, they could be taxable as
dividends to the borrower."
The Use of Unrelated Banks as Conduits
It is difficult to assess the number of instances in which commercial
banks have played a role in transferring funds to and from members of the
multinational group. The virtual impossibility of tracking and analyzing
these transactions has meant that, in theory, a multinational would be in
the position of circumventing the various exchange controls and tax regulations if it were willing to report these transactions in a substantially incorrect manner to the various governmental authorities. But quite apart from
this use of a bank as a pure pass-through, there are many instances wherein
38. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §956, 26 U.S.C.A. §956 (Rev. 1967). But see Treas. Reg.
§1.956-2(c)(2) (1964). See also H.R. Rep. 10612, §1021, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).

1976]

STRUCTURING PETRODOLLAR LOANS

a bank may legitimately assume the risks, rights, and responsibilities of
two counter-balancing transactions and stand as creditor on the one hand,
and debtor on the other. For example, let us assume that our Kuwaiti
lender wishes to place $50 million in the U.S. and that he has been unable
to take advantage of any other particular plan. It may be possible for the
lender to purchase a time certificate of deposit with a financial institution
(probably a merchant bank) in the United Kingdom which then would
agree to make a substantial loan to the borrower in the United States. If
the two transactions are legally, and in reality, two parts of the same
whole, then the three parties have effectively worked to avoid U.S. withholding tax on interest payments by an improper use of the jurisdiction.
If, on the other hand, the two transactions are legally separate, if the
merchant bank advances the funds to the U.S. borrower without a direct
security interest being provided in the form of the certificate of deposit,
and if the validity of the certificate of deposit to the Kuwaiti lender is not
legally dependent upon the repayment of the advance by the bank to the
U.S. borrower, then the bank may be said to have effected a real twotransaction deal. In this case, the bank, resident in the United Kingdom,
is performing its proper function as the gatherer of funds in an open market
and the subsequent placing of those funds to borrowers at a profit. The fact
that the placement of the funds and the purchase of the money by the bank
are tied in point of time and amount would not appear, per se, to turn the
two-transaction deal into a one-transaction deal. It must be remembered
that fundamentally every bank is in the position of purchasing money and
relending it to customers. Moreover, because of the pricing mechanism of
loans made in the Euro-currency market (wherein loans bear interest at a
fixed amount above the cost to the lending financial institution), every
bank operating in that market can be said to be doing the same type of
deal every day. It is only at the point where the bank serves as a mere agent
for both Kuwaiti lender and American borrower that the two transactions
become suspect. Thus, for a fee, the U.S. withholding tax of 30% on the
interest payments which are flowing ultimately to the Kuwaiti lender has
been reduced to zero.
Use of Captive Finance Subsidiaries
At various points we have alluded to the use of international finance
subsidiaries by U.S. corporate borrowers. These entities were designed
specifically to satisfy certain conditions to marketing Euro-bonds in public
offerings. Depending on where the proceeds of the placement were to be
used, the vehicle was either a domestic corporation ("80-20" company) or
a foreign corporation, the latter usually located in the Netherlands Antilles.
The 80-20 subsidiary was employed when most of the proceeds of the
borrowing were to be invested abroad. The interest paid by such a corporation is treated by the Internal Revenue Code as foreign source, and thereby
exempt from U.S. witholding tax only if less than 20% of this domestic
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corporation's gross income comes from United States sources. An additional prerequisite, that the bond issue be insulated from United States
markets through operation of the interest equalization tax, was satisfied
by qualifying the finance subsidiary under section 4912(b)(3) as one
"formed or availed of" to raise money for a foreign borrower2 9 In practice,
an advance ruling was obtained to this effect from the Internal Revenue
Service (and the applicability of IET noted on the bonds).
In practice, a further requirement was imposed by the I.R.S. that the
finance subsidiary have a debt-to-equity ratio of no more than five to one.
Although the finance subsidiary had no function other than issuing Eurobonds and investing the proceeds, it was felt by the Service that it should
have at least some "substance" in order to be treated as a corporate entity
separate from its parent. The 5:1 rule was established through numerous
private rulings as the arbitrary standard to be met. Failing this, the I.R.S.,
in effect, threatened to contend that since the finance subsidiary's bonds
were unconditionally guaranteed by its 100% shareholder, they were in fact
issued by that shareholder (the proceeds being contributed to the capital
of the finance subsidiary). Such a by-pass of the finance subsidiary by the
I.R.S. would have subjected the foreign bondholders to United States withholding tax on the interest payments since the parent normally could not
satisfy the 80-20 rule.
When the proceeds were to be invested primarily in the United States,
a Netherlands Antilles (N.A.) finance subsidiary was ordinarily selected
since the combination of the United States-Netherlands Tax Treaty4 (as
extended to the Netherlands Antilles) 4' and N.A. tax law provides the
requisite exemptions from withholding tax. Although this route offers
greater flexibility in investing the Euro-bond proceeds (since no source-ofincome requirements have to be met), there are drawbacks. First, in order
to qualify for the withholding tax exemption under the treaty, the finance
subsidiary must obtain a certificate from the N.A. authorities that it is
subject to the full rate of tax in the Netherlands Antilles, and not the
preferential holding company rates. In practice, the N.A. authorities provide the certificate on the condition that the subsidiary pay full rates of
tax on a deemed annual income of a least 1% of the face amount of the
bonds. The payment of this tax often has increased the effective cost of
financing.
Secondly, the foreign finance subsidiary also is required to maintain at
least a 5:1 ratio. From a practical standpoint, the subsidiary must be
capitalized with cash. 2 As a general rule, the United States parent bor39. 26 U.S.C.A. §4912(b)(3) (Rev. 1967).
40. Treaty with the Netherlands on Double Taxation, April 29, 1948 [1947], 6 Stat. 1757,
T.I.A.S. No. 1855.
41. Protocol of June 15, 1955 [1955], 6 U.S.T. 3696, T.I.A.S. No. 3366.
42. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §367, 26 U.S.C.A. §367 (Supp. 1975).

1976]

STRUCTURING PETRODOLLAR LOANS

rowed the cash to capitalize the finance subsidiary from a foreign bank,
and the subsidiary then deposited the funds under its name with a branch
of the same bank.
The finance subsidiary was created not by legislative action, but rather
by a complex utilization of existing tax law and treaty provisions, together
with tacit Treasury cooperation. Believing that this system resulted in
unnecessary cost and administrative effort, the U.S. Treasury became interested in simplifying the foreign borrowing process. Further, from the
Treasury's viewpoint, the tax paid to the Netherlands Antilles represented
both a loss of tax revenue and a balance of payments drain of at least three
to four million dollars annually on approximately $1.2 billion of outstanding N.A. public issues. Finally, the requirement of a 5:1 debt-equity ratio
(besides being arbitrary and difficult to justify) has sometimes tied up
funds abroad that might otherwise have been kept in or returned to the
United States.
The first step toward simplification was to eliminate the necessity of an
IET ruling. In addition to being costly and time consuming, this approach
proved unsatisfactory where it could be asserted that one of the statutory
exclusions from IET should apply to the subsidiary's bonds. The next
logical step was to eliminate the need for finance subsidiaries altogether,
particularly those located outside the United States. This would end the
arbitrary 5:1 debt-equity ratio and the complex corporate structures required to avoid withholding tax on interest payments to bondholders, and
would reduce the cost of long-term foreign borrowing.
The IET Extension Act of 197111 contained both the IET election procedure and the necessary amendment to the source-of-income rules. United
States corporations and partnerships now could elect to have IET apply
either to a new or original debt issue, or to an issue which was already
outstanding on April 1, 1971, and which was treated under IRC section
4912(b)(3) as a debt issue of a foreign obligor." Thus, it seemed the clear
intent of the Congress to extend the benefit of the new foreign borrowing
procedures not only to new issues, but also to issues already outstanding."
The Senate version of the bill added the complementary amendment
providing a withholding tax exemption for interest paid on bond issues for
which a section 4912(c) election is made. Section 861(a)(1)(g) states that
such interest will automatically be considered non-U.S. source (or foreign
source) income to the recipient if the obligations (1) when issued (or
treated as issued) had a maturity of not more than 15 years and (2) when
43. 26 U.S.C.A. §4911 et. seq. (Supp. 1975).
44. 26 U.S.C.A. §4912(c) (Rev. 1967).
45. Several conditions were also imposed, i.e., that none of the normal exclusions from
IET (including prior American ownership) would apply and that the rate applicable to stock
would apply to a U.S. person acquiring the bond. Apparently, both of these conditions were
designed to reinforce the barrier against the aquisition by United States persons of Eurobonds.
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issued, were "purchased by one or more underwriters with a view to distribution through resale." 4
As non-U.S. source income, the interest payments to non-resident alien
individuals and foreign corporations are, of course, exempt from withholding tax. This exemption applies, however, only to interest attributable to
the periods after the date on which the IET election is'made. In order to
permit elimination of existing finance subsidiaries, the Act provided that
the outstanding debt of a finance subsidiary may be assumed by its United
States parent, provided the two are members of a controlled group.,7 Since,
under section 4912(c)(2), the assumption by the parent corporation was
treated as the issuance of a new or original issue, no IET was levied on the
assumption. Similarly, no IET was to be levied on an acquisition of outstanding debt issues under a right to convert or exchange a debt obligation
of a guarantor, provided the right or guarantee existed at the time the
obligation first became subject to an IET election.
An interesting side benefit of the intended simplification of financing
was the elimination of the complex and potentially serious question of gain
on conversion of Euro-bonds into stock of the parent company. The
uncertainties about the proper tax treatment have never been fully resolved, and the possibility still remains that, under certain circumstances,
the finance subsidiary could recognize substantial capital gains on conversion.
Certain remaining problems (e.g., exemption of nonresident holders
from U.S. estate duty) were eliminated on later legislation. The real difficulty was that the interest equalization tax itself was allowed to expire in
1974 and the Service subsequently refused to issue private rulings on the
integrity of captive finance subsidiaries."
Given these conditions, it would seem difficult for a prudent advisor to
recommend the use of any plan calling for a finance company which is a
captive of the borrower.
Debt Placements with Variations
Even if the proposed statutory elimination 49 of the U.S. withholding tax
were enacted into law, there would remain a serious problem of that tax
in an area which is currently undergoing particularly significant growth:
the investment by petroleum exporters in special projects and operating
businesses in the United States. The real advantage of placing money
outside normal banking channels is not so much ease of administration,
46. 26 U.S.C.A. §861(a)(1)(g) (Supp. 1975).
47. 26 U.S.C.A. §4911 (Supp. 1975).
48. The whole business might have been described by Terence as the creation of magno
conatu magnas nugas.
49. See Proposed Tax Reform Act of 1975, H.R. Rep. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
Although this bill was allowed to die, apparently by the consensus of Congress and the
Treasury, it seems certain that many of its provisions will be reintroduced either in 1976 or
1977.
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but rather the possibility of earning greater profits. Like many non-U.S.
investors holding liquid reserves, petroleum exporters are concerned with
problems of inflation and maintenance of earnings over a long period of
time. Thus, many potential U.S. borrowers find themselves in the position
of trying to offer a loan package to a lender which provides not only for a
significant rate of interest, but also certain additional fees, or even a share
in the profits of the venture. Since the addition of a legal equity position
in a particular venture can change the tax planning to both lender and
borrower drastically, it will often be advantageous for both to attempt to
structure these additional costs in some form other than equity. The simplest means would be the addition of certain bonus interest costs, initial
fees, etc. If these amounts become excessive and if they are dependent
upon the. earnings by the project before payment is legally required, then
all of them (and possibly a portion of the stated interest as well) could be
reclassified as dividend payments by the Internal Revenue Service. The
consequences to the borrower would be denial of a deduction in computing
taxable income in the amount of the payment and potentially different
treatment with respect to withholding tax.
Loans with a Real Share in the Profits
It may be much neater to separate the total "fee" to be paid for the
borrowing of the money (which fee includes interest, equity, and other fees)
by specifying a particular amount of equity in the project to be paid to the
lender. For example, a Kuwaiti could lend $50 million for 15 years with
no amortization for a period of five years and an option on stock entitled
to 10% of the earnings of the venture. The use of an option would substantially shield the investor from sharing in the losses as well as the profits of
the particular business. The debt portion of the investment could presumably be run through one of the structures which have been mentioned
above; the equity portions may create other problems. If, in fact, the venture does make a profit and is about to pay dividends on its common stock
(or on the class of common stock held by the Kuwaitis in the case that
there is more than one class), the law may provide a different treatment
either for all foreign holders of equity instruments in U.S. corporations, or
for all foreign holders of a certain minimal percentage (which would presumably change the classification from "portfolio" investor to "direct"
investor in the project). Even if we are able to set up conduit corporations
between the Kuwaitis and the U.S. project, there will almost certainly be
some form of dividend withholding tax. If, on the other hand, the Kuwaitis
had the possibility of letting the earnings accumulate in the corporation
and subsequently selling its equity share at a substantial gain, it might
have the opportunity to make that gain without any U.S. tax at all as long
as its holding of those securities and the subsequent sale were not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United
States .50.

INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §882, 26 U.S.C.A. §882 (Rev. 1967).
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Finally, it frequently may be possible to combine the earning of passive
income and the substantial gain through the use of the special advantages
through a Netherland Antilles holding company."
Loans with Optional Equity
The implementation of an optional equity feature may also be effected
with the use of warrants for existing stock or the issuance of convertible
debt obligations. Each of these provides a number of additional planning
opportunities, but a number of problems as well. In the case of convertible
debentures, for example, the most likely type would be a debt instrument
convertible not into shares of the U.S. subsidiary operating a particular
project, but to the common stock of the U.S. parent which is the real
borrower. The myriad of unanswered tax questions resulting from this type
of convertible debt placement would, in and of itself, make this an
undesirable option.52
Analysis of Business Conditions: Timing Problem
At the outset, both investor and borrower must satisfy themselves that
the payment of passive income, the timely repayment of principal, and the
appreciation of the various equity interests in the venture are commensurate with the risks taken. A number of ventures throw off no cash for several
years; this raises the possibility of a borrower obtaining substantial advantage under an agreement whereby he pays a higher effective interest rate
but enjoys a holiday from interest and principal repayments for that initial
period.
In addition, we have not considered the types of variations that may be
present where the project is a true joint business venture. Such may be the
case when dealing with a particularly large construction project, especially
one related to the petroleum business. A U.S. borrower, setting up a business which would provide significant export to the home country of the
investor, may call on sources of money from that country. In these circumstances, it may be appropriate to experiment with separate classes of stock,
preferred and common stock, etc. From the point of view of both parties,
the captial structure should provide the adequate cash flow for the business, should provide the cash investor with a reasonably transferable and
marketable share of the project, and should provide the U.S. corporation
with sufficient protection against his captial sources of drying up.
51. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §337, 26 U.S.C.A. §337 (Rev. 1967) and Treaty with the
Netherlands on Double Taxation, April 29, 1948 [1947], 6 Stat. 1757, T.I.A.S. No. 1855, as
extended to the Netherlands Antilles by Protocol, June 15, 1955 [1955], 6 U.S.T. 3696,
T.I.A.S. No. 3366 and supplemented by Protocol, October 23, 1963 [1965], art. II, 15 U.S.T.
1900, T.I.A.S. No. 5665.
52. For a detailed analysis, see Mentz and others, A Report on International Finance
Subsidies, 28 TAx L. REv. 443 (1973).
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In addition to the above, the prudent advisor would consider the effects
of any exchange gain or loss to the borrower. Furthermore, any separatelyincorporated project which is itself the borrower may be subject to attack
on the grounds that it is thinly capitalized.
III.

CONCLUSION

At this writing, the possibility of unilateral tax amendment by the
United States still exists. Even if not acted on during the year 1976, this
measure is certain to be considered'in subsequent sessions of Congress. As
noted above, the role of international banks in serving as vehicles for these
loan transactions may increase dramatically.
Barring these developments, however, the advisor faced with the need
to create a structure at this time must deal with a number of issues which
remain unresolved and cannot offer his client a transaction eliminating all
significant risk.

